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In the bundle of property owners’ rights, the right to exclude others 
(and objects others propel) is paramount, essential, and defining.1 Tradition-
al common law extended a property owner’s right to exclude up to the sky.2 
Strict-liability trespass laws protected property owners against any border 
crossing, whether that border was a horizontal parcel boundary on the sur-
face of the land or a vertical boundary in the air.3 This straightforward, pre-
dictable exclusion regime promoted low-cost resolutions of conflicts and 
efficient bargaining for precious land resources.4 
But as certain altitudes of airspace became navigable and valuable as a 
public thoroughfare, Congress and the Supreme Court recognized that al-
lowing surface owners to exclude others from a column of airspace to the 
sky was no longer viable,5 and the federal government asserted control over 
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 1. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see, e.g., Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176); Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same); Nollan v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (same); State v. Hamzy, 288 Ark. 561, 565, 
709 S.W.2d 397, 399 (1986) (“One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to 
exclude others . . . .”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 
NEB. L. REV. 730, 753 (1998) (“to the extent one has the right to exclude, then one has prop-
erty; conversely, to the extent one does not have exclusion rights, one does not have proper-
ty”). 
 2. See EDWARD COKE, 1 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY 
UPON LITTLETON § 4(A) (CHARLES BUTLER ED., 18TH ED., CORRECTED, 1823) (1670); 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18 (Lewis ed. 1915). 
 3. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 174 (2015). 
Professor Rule’s excellent article applies principles of microeconomics and property theory 
to the property law issues arising from the use of drones. Id. at 155. 
 4. Id. at 178. (noting that “these exclusion-based rules bundle together several of the 
myriad potential uses of land and protect them in one fell swoop by simply protecting physi-
cal ‘access’ to the land itself”) (quoting Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two 
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S455 (2002)). 
 5. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (authorizing 
flights within navigable airspace and charging federal government with ensuring flight safe-
ty); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (holding that, for purposes of a feder-
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“aircraft” in the “navigable airspace.”6 Navigable airspace, and thereby fed-
eral jurisdiction, was roughly fixed as starting at 500 feet, but because fixed-
wing aircraft generally stay above 500 feet, courts were not forced to clearly 
define what rights—if any—a surface owner retained to exclude aircraft at 
lower altitudes.7 
Drones8 have given new value to low- and mid-level airspace, yet in 
almost all states, property owners lack a clear right to exclude drones as they 
would a trespasser on the land—contrary to what many property owners 
would assume. This confusion over the right to exclude has even made its 
way to television legal dramas. In an episode of The Good Wife, attorney 
Claire’s client sued a security company for trespass after the company’s 
drone repeatedly crossed into the airspace over the client’s property.9 The 
client was a therapist who saw patients in a home office, and he wished to 
exclude the drone because he claimed the drone flights were frightening 
away his patients.10 The court denied the trespass claim, recognizing that 
under Illinois law, the client had no right to exclude drones from over his 
property.11 The client’s frustration lead to a self-help measure: the client shot 
the drone from the sky, and was prosecuted for it.12 
This fictional storyline dramatizes real-life conflict. In July 2015, a 
Kentucky man was arrested for shooting down a drone he claimed was fly-
ing and hovering over his sunbathing daughters.13 The state judge dropped 
 
al takings claim, the surface owner did not own navigable airspace); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. 
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Aviation has added a 
new dimension to travel and to our ideas. The ancient idea that landlordism and sovereignty 
extend from the center of the world to the periphery of the universe has been modified. Today 
the landowner no more possesses a vertical control of all the air above him than a shore own-
er possesses horizontal control of all the sea before him. The air is too precious as an open 
highway to permit it to be ‘owned’ to the exclusion or embarrassment of air navigation by 
surface landlords who could put it to little real use.”). 
 6. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 §§ 1(24), 3; Air Commerce Act of 1926 § 10. 
 7. See Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 157, 161 (1990) (noting that the “battle . . . continues to rage in the low alti-
tude airspace arena”). 
 8. Arkansas’s Unlawful Use of Unmanned Aircraft System defines “unmanned aircraft 
system” as an aircraft that does not carry a human operator, can be autonomous or remotely 
piloted or operated, and can be expendable or recoverable. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-
103(a)(2)(A) (Repl. 2016). Drones are also called unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), Un-
manned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and unmanned aircraft. For ease of reference, this article 
will refer to all unmanned aircraft as “drones.” 
 9. The Good Wife: Unmanned (CBS television broadcast March 27, 2016). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Elisha Fieldstadt, Case Dismissed Against William H. Meredith, Kentucky Man 
Arrested for Shooting Down Drone, NBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2015, 1:28 PM ET), http://www.
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all charges, finding that the drone invaded the defendant’s privacy and gave 
him the right to violent self-help.14 Although shooting down a drone is a 
state and a federal crime,15 increasing acts of self-help and judicial sympathy 
for them indicate how unacceptable it is to many that we may not be able to 
exclude drones from the airspace above our private property.16 
All states are struggling with the uncertainties that drone conflicts re-
veal in airspace law, but no state has acted to clarify its laws by going as far 
as to grant surface owners clear exclusionary rights over lower altitudes of 
airspace over their properties. Instead, many states, including Arkansas, 
have acted to regulate the conduct of drone operations. This article examines 
Arkansas’s current statutory and common law regulating private drone oper-
ations and explains why the current law fails to ensure predictable outcomes 
that will govern behavior and prevent conflict. 
As described above, the root problem is that the law governing airspace 
ownership was shaped by conflicts caused by a significantly different kind 
of aircraft. Part II of the article describes the likely rise of drone conflicts 
and Arkansas’s current conduct-based laws that target drones. Again, as 
broad as the new statutory restrictions are, they do not give a property owner 
a clear right to exclude a drone that is otherwise operating legally. Part III 
tracks the historical development of Arkansas airspace law, highlighting the 
uncertainty of the current nuisance-based rule of airspace ownership. The 
law that was adequate to address fixed-wing overflights does not easily or 
predictably resolve drone overflights. But Part IV discusses why a return to 
allowing surface owners a zone of airspace ownership within which they 
may exclude drones is appealing, but unlikely given aggressive federal regu-
lations. And yet when the law runs counter to surface owners’ expectations 
and fails to recognize and clearly define the airspace rights of surface own-




 14. Id. 
 15. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-38-203, -204 (Repl. 2013) (prohibiting “purposely and 
without legal justification or “recklessly” destroying or causing damage to the property of 
another); 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2012) (prohibiting the willful destruction or damage to “any aircraft 
in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or 
employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce”). 
 16. See Eric Limer, People Just Keep Shooting Down Their Neighbors’ Drones, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (May 27, 2016), http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/drones
/a21072/people-just-keep-shooting-down-drones/ (indicating none of those charged with 
shooting down a neighbor’s drone have been convicted). 
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II. ARKANSAS’S REGULATION OF THE OPERATION OF DRONES 
The increase in the use of drones presents a second revolution in air-
space rights. Arkansas’s law adopted in response to the first revolution, the 
advent of fixed-wing aircraft, has not been amended and has been rarely 
interpreted in the years since. It does not provide surface owners the clear 
right to exclude drones, even drones flying at low altitudes. 
Instead of altering its airspace ownership statute to allow a right to ex-
clude, the Arkansas legislature has responded to the potential of drone con-
flict with criminal codes restricting the conduct of drone operations. This 
section briefly describes the conflicts drones are likely to present and the 
statutes Arkansas has adopted, as compared to statutory steps other states 
have taken. 
A. The Increasing Potential for Conflicts Caused by Drone Operations 
The characteristics of drones and drone use make it likely that conflicts 
between drone operators and private property owners will be more frequent 
than conflicts between fixed aircraft and private property owners have been. 
First, drones are not restricted to airports because they can take off and land 
from anywhere, and their range is increasing. For example, a mid-level con-
sumer-grade drone, the DJI Phantom, which costs under $500, can go 1600 
feet in the air, travel 44 miles per hour, has a 3.1 mile range, and has a cam-
era that records in 4K resolution.17 A drone developed in Germany promises 
more than an hour of flight-time on a single charge, speeds of more than 60 
mph, and a range of over thirty miles.18 This flexibility of flight patterns and 
the increase in capacity and range threaten to increase conflict between 
drone operators and those who would like to exclude them from their prop-
erty. 
Second, drones are already more prevalent than fixed-wing aircraft. 
Drone sales are expected to grow from 2.5 million in 2016 to 7 million in 
2020.19 In the first nine months after the FAA created a drone registration 
system, more than 550,000 unmanned aircraft were registered, and new reg-
 
 17. Aymann Ismail, What Can Consumer Drones Actually See?, SLATE (Mar. 7, 2017, 
11:50 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/05/how_much_can_
consumer_drones_actually_see.html (noting as well that the drone sounds “like a lawnmow-
er”). 
 18. Nick Heath, The Long-Range Drone that Can Keep Up with a Car and Fly for an 
Hour, TECHREPUBLIC (May 27, 2015, 7:31 AM PST), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/
european-technology/the-long-range-drone-that-can-keep-up-with-a-car-and-fly-for-an-hour/. 
The FAA recently limited drones to a speed of 100 mph. See 14 C.F.R. §107.51 (2016). 
 19. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 
2016-2036, at 31 (2016), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/m
edia/FY2016-36_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf. 
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istrations are coming in at a rate of 2,000 a day.20 Third, drones are used by 
private industry and individuals more than they are used by the government. 
According to the FAA, the top commercial uses in the drone market are in-
dustrial inspection (42%), real estate and aerial photography (22%), agricul-
ture (19%), and insurance (15%); governmental use is only 2% of the mar-
ket.21 Drones are being used to inspect wind turbines,22 to monitor wildlife 
conservation,23 to deliver first aid,24 to spot mold on leaves,25 and even to 
prevent shark attacks.26 In addition, the FAA estimates that hobbyist sales 
will more than double from 1.9 million drones in 2016 to 4.3 million in 
2020.27 (But FAA estimates have been easily exceeded in the past.28) 
The increasing and significant role drones play in commerce justifies 
Congress’s recent charge to the FAA to integrate drone regulation into the 
regulations governing national airspace and to adopt regulations that would 
improve the predictability of the law.29 Integrating drones into the national 
airspace promises significant economic benefit; the Association for Un-
manned Vehicle Systems estimates that the United States loses more than 
$10 billion for every year that integration of drones is delayed, or a total loss 
 
 20. See Joan Lowy, FAA Contemplating Whether Millions of Drones Will Fill Skies, AP 
THE BIG STORY (Sept. 17, 2016, 2:46 PM EDT), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/be086f2e1a7345b697f627adc732dfb1/faa-contemplating-whether-millions-drones-will-fill-
skies. 
 21. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 19, at 33. 
 22. See Brian Merchant, Wind Turbine Drone Inspection Could be a $6 Billion Industry 
in Under a Decade, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 10, 2015, 2:50 PM), http://motherboard
.vice.com/read/wind-turbine-drone-inspection-will-be-a-6-billion-industry-in-under-10-years. 
 23. See The Mission of conservationdrones.org, CONSERVATION DRONES, 
https://conservationdrones.org/mission/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
 24. See John Biggs, This Ambulance Drone Can Fly into Trouble with First Aid, 
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 31, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/10/31/this-ambulance-drone-can-
fly-into-trouble-with-first-aid/. 
 25. See Rachel Rohr, Using Drones in the Fight Against Apple Scab, MODERN FARMER 
(Oct. 28, 2013), http://modernfarmer.com/2013/10/apple-scab-drone/. 
 26. See Katherine LaGrave, How Australia is Using Drones to Prevent Shark Attacks, 
CONDÉ NAST TRAVELER (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2016-03-09/how-
australia-is-using-drones-to-prevent-shark-attacks. 
 27. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 19; see also Michal Addady, The 
Number of Drones Expected to Sell During the Holidays is Scaring the Government, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/29/drones-holiday-sales/ (noting the 
FAA’s concern that over one million drones would be sold in the 2015 Christmas season). 
 28. See Lowy, supra note 20; see also Alan Levin, Thousands Sign Up for FAA’s Drone 
Pilot Test, BOST. GLOBE (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/
08/29/thousands-sign-for-faa-drone-pilot-test/8g9ZETh3DzL8Ajx1lPg1aP/story.html (giving 
as an example that the agency anticipated 15,000 drone operators would be licensed by the 
end of 2016; 3,030 registered to take the test on the first day, and the FAA now estimates 
there will be more than 171,000 pilots within a year). 
 29. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332, 126 Stat. 
11, 73–75. 
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of $27.6 million per day.30 Businesses and legal scholars alike urge state and 
federal governments to proactively craft a practical legal framework for the 
integration of commercial drones.31 
B. Arkansas’s Conduct-Based Regulation of Drones 
Even after the FAA fully integrates the regulation of commercial 
drones into the regulation of the national airspace, state legislation will con-
tinue to be essential to the legal framework governing drones because the 
FAA—even under its broadest interpretation of its own authority—was cre-
ated to ensure the safety of aircraft and flight, not to adjudicate privacy or 
property.32 Further, states have experience regulating these issues, and al-
lowing them to do so fosters experimentation that may inform other states 
and the federal government on further legislation.33 In 2015, 45 states (in-
cluding Arkansas) considered 168 bills related to drones.34 In 2016, 38 states 
 
 30. See Darryl Jenkins & Bijan Vasigh, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, The 
Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the United States 2 (2013), 
available at https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-
9807-f9a4e95d1ef1/UploadedImages/New_Economic%20Report%202013%20Full.pdf (con-
cluding that “[t]he main inhibitor of U.S. commercial and civil development of [drones] is the 
lack of a regulatory structure”). 
 31. See Bart Jansen, Amazon Urges Faster FAA Approval of Drones, USA TODAY (Mar. 
24, 2015, 2:32 p.m. ET), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/03/24/amazon-drones-
faa-senate-hearing/70376382/ (describing Amazon CEO’s testimony before Congress that the 
wait for FAA rulemaking disappointed the industry); Nicholas Ryan Turza, Dr. Dronelove: 
How We Should All Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Commercial Drones, 15 N.C.J.L. & 
TECH. ON. 319, 320 (2014). 
 32. See 14 C.F.R. §107.1 (2016) (adjudicating private property rights is beyond the 
scope of this rule; trespass specifically reserved to state); FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, State and Local Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Fact 
Sheet, at 3 (Dec 17, 2015) (privacy and trespass laws not preempted); see also Florida v. 
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452, (1989) (O’Conner, J., concurring) (opining that the scope of 4th 
Amendment protection is “too heavily on compliance with FAA regulations whose purpose is 
to promote air safety, not to protect ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures’” (quoting 4th 
amendment)); Aviation Cadet Museum, Inc. v. Hammer, 373 Ark. 202, 205, 283 S.W.3d 198, 
201 (2008) (specifically noting land use as an area of law still retained by state government). 
 33. See Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They 
Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 67–68 (2013) (noting the value of state experimentation, and 
recommending that “[a]t the least, Congress should avoid preempting state regulation in any 
drone privacy statute it does enact”). 
 34. Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-
law-landscape.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/L55M-KAPL (last updated Sep. 30, 2016). 
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(including Arkansas) considered legislation, and 17 states passed 31 pieces 
of legislation.35 
These state legislative efforts have been primarily focused on the con-
duct of drones, and not on property owners’ right to exclude drones. This 
section describes Arkansas’s legislative efforts—which broadly prohibit 
drone operations that may violate privacy, but do not clarify what consti-
tutes airspace trespass—and compares those efforts with similar statutes 
from other states. 
1. Statutory Protections of Privacy Related to Drones 
In 2015, the Arkansas Legislature added to the crimes of video voyeur-
ism and voyeurism. Arkansas Code § 5-16-101 now makes it unlawful: 
to knowingly use an unmanned vehicle or aircraft, a camcorder, a motion 
picture camera, a photographic camera of any type, or other equipment 
that is concealed, flown in a manner to escape detection, or disguised to 
secretly or surreptitiously videotape, film, photograph, record, or view 
by electronic means a person: 
(1) For the purpose of viewing any portion of the person’s 
body that is covered with clothing and for which the person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
(2) Without the knowledge or consent of the person being 
videotaped, filmed, photographed, recorded, or viewed by 
electronic means; and 
(3) Under circumstances in which the person being vide-
otaped, filmed, photographed, recorded, or viewed by elec-
tronic means has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
36 
 
 35. State Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 2015 Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-unmanned-aircraft-
systems-uas-2015-legislation.aspx (last updated Jan. 5, 2017). Other states have acted to 
prohibit drone operations that Arkansas still, apparently, allows. In 2016, Arizona, California, 
Delaware, and Louisiana considered whether to prohibit drone flights from interfering with 
first responders, and Louisiana gave law enforcement the right to disable drones that endan-
ger the public or an officer’s safety. Delaware considered whether to prohibit operation of a 
drone over any event with more than 1500 attendees. And several states—including Idaho, 
Indiana, and Wisconsin—considered acts that would prohibit using drones to hunt, molest, or 
locate game animals. Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, National Conference 
of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-
state-law-landscape.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/L55M-KAPL (last updated Dec. 16, 
2016). 
 36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-101(b) (Supp. 2015) 
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Arkansas Code § 5-16-102 further prohibits a person entering another 
person’s private property through use of a drone and looking into any per-
son’s dwelling unit if (1) the drone operator “looks into the dwelling with 
the purpose to intrude upon or interfere with a person’s privacy”; (2) the 
drone operator “looks into a part of the dwelling in which an individual is 
present”; (3) the individual “has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
part of the dwelling”; and (4) the individual does not consent.37 
Combined, these sections broadly prohibit any kind of surveillance 
over another on another’s property, so long as that person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and has not consented. An Arkansas court would 
likely find that someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her 
home,38 but not in a driveway or a walkway in front of the house.39 The 
breadth of this prohibition has led one commentator to advise that, if you are 
flying a drone over private property in Arkansas, you should probably just 
turn your camera off.40 
Other states have acted similarly to prohibit using drones to intrude up-
on others’ privacy. Kansas included certain uses of drones in its preexisting 
Protection from Stalking Act.41 Mississippi has broadened its voyeurism law 
to prohibit using drones to view “the interior of [an] area in which the occu-
pant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to invade the 
privacy of a person or persons inside and without the consent or knowledge 
of every person present, for the lewd, licentious and indecent purpose of 
spying upon the occupant or occupants thereof.”42 
Florida prohibits drone surveillance without tying it to voyeurism, and 
it thereby also prohibits surveillance of property.43 Florida’s Freedom from 
Unwarranted Surveillance Act prohibits any drone surveillance that violates 
a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.44 “Surveillance” is defined as 
observing a person with “sufficient visual clarity to be able to obtain infor-
mation about their identity, habits, conduct, movement, or whereabouts,” or 
as observing property’s physical improvements with “sufficient visual clari-
 
 37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-102(b)(2) (Supp. 2015). 
 38. Sanders v. State, 264 Ark. 433, 436, 572 S.W.2d 397, 398 (1978) (a person’s dwell-
ing and curtilage are areas normally considered free from government intrusion). 
 39. Walley v. State, 353 Ark. 586, 605, 112 S.W.3d 349, 360 (2003) (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) and United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 
(9th Cir. 1975)); McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216, 222, 119 S.W.3d 41, 45 (2003). 
 40. National Business Institute, Drone Law from A to Z (comments of Richard Jost). 
 41. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-31a02(d) (2016). 
 42. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-61(1)(b) (West 2017). 
 43. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(3)(b) (West 2017). Federal legislators have also consid-
ered privacy issues raised by drones. See, e.g., Safeguarding Privacy and Fostering Aerospace 
Innovation Act of 2013, S. 1057, 113th Cong. (2013); Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transpar-
ency Act of 2013, H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 44. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(3)(b) (West 2017). 
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ty to be able to determine unique identifying features or its occupancy.”45 
Therefore, unlike Arkansas’s statute, the Florida Act specifically presumes 
people have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” when they are on their 
own land and are not observable from ground level.46 
Similarly, in 2016 California amended its already far-reaching law pro-
hibiting “physical invasion of privacy” to specifically prohibit entry into 
“airspace above the land of another without permission . . . in order to cap-
ture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression 
of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity and the 
invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.”47 
2. Statutory Protections of Critical Structures from Drone Surveil-
lance 
Arkansas, along with several other states, has created the “unlawful use 
of unmanned aircraft system” offense, which prohibits the knowing use of a 
drone to “conduct surveillance of, gather evidence or collect information 
about, or photographically or electronically record critical infrastructure 
without the prior written consent of the owner of the critical infrastruc-
ture.”48 Section 5-60-103 defines “critical infrastructure” as an electrical 
power generation or delivery system, a petroleum refinery, a chemical or 
rubber manufacturing facility, or a petroleum or chemical storage facility.49 
Other states that have adopted similar laws have included schools and cor-
rectional facilities within the definition of “critical infrastructure.”50 
 
 45. Id. § 934.50(2)(e). 
 46. Id. § 934.50(3)(b). 
 47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (West 2017); see Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of 
Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2000). The California standard is stricter than the 
traditional standard in privacy law, which protects individuals from actions that are “high-
ly offensive to a reasonable person.” See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977). 
 48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-103(b) (Rep. 2016). The statute exempts use of drones to 
conduct surveillance of specific critical infrastructure when done pursuant to a contract with 
the state or federal government; or pursuant to a prior written authorization from the FAA, 
the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management; or in connection with emergency 
management to aid in “incident command, area reconnaissance, personnel and equipment 
deployment monitoring, training, or a related purpose.” Id. § 5-60-103(a)(2)(B)(vi). The 
statute also allows individuals to conduct surveillance on their own property and to contract 
with others to provide the surveillance. Id. § 5-60-103(c)(1)(A). 
 49. Id. § 5-60-103(a)(1). 
 50. See Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft
-state-law-landscape.aspx (last updated Jan. 5, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/L55M-
KAPL (noting the application of a similar law to schools and correctional facilities in Arizo-
na, Delaware, and Louisiana; prohibition of drone use within 400 feet of critical infrastruc-
ture facility in Oklahoma; prohibition of drone use near critical infrastructure in Oregon; and 
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3. Potential Common Law Restrictions on Drone Use 
Although no Arkansas court has so held, drone operators may also be 
civilly liable for some conduct under existing Arkansas common law.51 An 
injury to person or property by a drone may be compensable under a negli-
gence claim.52 A property owner who wishes to stop drone overflights may 
argue that the overflights are an intrusion upon seclusion. In Arkansas, 
which has adopted the Restatement definition, this claim requires a showing 
that drone overflights are (1) an intrusion, which means they lacked legal 
permission; (2) highly offensive, which means the overflights rose to a level 
a reasonable person would find intolerable; and (3) a breach of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.53 Not only would it be difficult to demonstrate that 
drone overflights—which are not prohibited under Arkansas law—are 
“highly offensive,” it is uncertain whether an overflight itself would be 
viewed as a breach of a legitimate expectation of privacy. Again, no court 
has so held. 
Although the common law tort system has the advantage of being fact-
sensitive, and thereby being flexible in its application to emerging technolo-
gies,54 the disadvantage of a flexible system of laws is that property owners 
and drone operators cannot be certain about their rights until a court has 
decided a case with similar facts. Regulating drone conflicts through the tort 
system, therefore, requires property owners and drone operators to invest 
time and resources to build a body of law that provides clear guidance. 
III. THE UNCERTAIN FOUNDATION OF ARKANSAS’S AIRSPACE  
OWNERSHIP LAW 
While Arkansas’s voyeurism laws and the intrusion upon seclusion tort 
may be used to protect privacy, neither provides surface owners a clear right 
to exclude drones from airspace above their property, even if the drones are 
 
prohibition of drone use within 250 feet of critical infrastructure with the purpose of conduct-
ing surveillance or gathering information about the facility in Tennessee). 
 51. See Jordan M. Cash, DRONING ON AND ON: A TORT APPROACH TO REGULATING 
HOBBYIST DRONES, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 695 (2016) (analyzing the common law torts of in-
trusion upon seclusion and trespass to argue that a tort approach to drone intrusions could 
prove to be a useful tool in the fast changing and complex world of emerging technology). 
 52. See Cent. Flying Serv. v. Crigger, 215 Ark. 400, 402–03, 221 S.W.2d 45, 46 (1949) 
(recognizing a claim for negligence or for negligent entrustment to another operator for inju-
ries caused by aircraft). 
 53. Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 875–76 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
 54. Id. 
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within sight and sound.55 Arkansas, like many jurisdictions, has not amend-
ed the airspace ownership statutes adopted with the dawn of the age of 
flight—statutes that balance the rights of the surface owner against the right 
of flight, and statutes that have only rarely been applied and interpreted.56 
Because these statutes are typically applied only in conflicts between air-
ports and neighboring landowners over disruptions caused by take-offs and 
landings, courts have not resolved ambiguities in the statutes’ broader appli-
cation.57 
Resolving these ambiguities—like how far up surface owners’ airspace 
rights extend and how disruptive overflights must be to be unlawful—is 
critical to preventing and deciding drone conflicts. Arkansas’s airspace stat-
ute’s structure and flaws are best understood in historical context, beginning 
with the original adjustments state and federal governments had to make to 
traditional property rights to account for airspace that had value as a public 
thoroughfare. 
A. The Traditional, Predictable Rule of Trespass 
Before airspace could be occupied by anything other than objects on 
the surface of the land, American common law, through the maxim cujus est 
solum, ejus est usque ad coelom, gave landowners all the space above and 
below their properties, and any breach—no matter how minor, no matter 
what the intent—was a trespass.58 This principal governed disputes predicta-
bly and uniformly.59 Neighbors who fired a shotgun over another’s property 
were held to have committed a technical trespass because the shotgun pellet 
crossed the plane of the landowner’s airspace.60 Similarly, when a horse’s 
 
 55. See Michael A. Thompson, The Emerging Field of Drone Law, THE ARKANSAS 
LAWYER, vol. 51, no. 4 Fall 2016 at 27, 28 (“One issue that seems ripe to lead to new dis-
putes, however, is the law of trespass. . . [D]rones would seem to raise significant questions 
as to what constitutes unreasonable interference with existing use and enjoyment or ‘actual 
damage’ to land, and the courts and/or legislature may be called upon to balance the privacy 
and security concerns of landowners with the right of drone operators to use the ‘public 
highway’ of this state’s airspace.”). 
 56. See infra Section III.C. 
 57. See infra Section III.C. 
 58. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 18, n.19 
(Lewis ed. 1915) (interpreting the phrase as granting ownership “upwards as well as down-
wards, to an indefinite extent”); see also Turza, supra note 31, at 326. 
 59. See Maxwell Mensinger, Note, Remodeling “Model Aircraft”: Why Restrictive 
Language that Grounded the Unmanned Industry Should Cease to Govern It, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 409, 410 (2015) (noting that American courts adopted the Lord Coke maxim with 
“nearly ‘unquestioning acceptance’”). 
 60. See Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 329 (1925); see also Chad J. Pomeroy, All 
Your Air Right Are Belong to Us, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 285 (2015). 
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head crossed over another’s dividing fence, the act constituted trespass.61 
Trespass has been similarly straightforward in Arkansas,62 and it has been 
applied to cases where the boundary line crossed is vertical, through the 
airspace. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court found in Gathings v. 
Johns that a plaintiff had “no right to maintain a spreading hedge extending 
over and onto the defendant’s adjoining land.”63 This approach to airspace 
ownership “regards the empty space as if it were a solid, inseparable from 
the soil, and protects it from hostile occupation accordingly.”64 
The absolute theory of ownership for both surface and airspace worked 
predictably for decades in both tort and property for claims of nuisance, 
trespass, and ejectment.65 This strict private property system, or exclusion 
regime,66 benefitted landowners, neighbors, and courts by defining bounda-
ries and promoting efficient bargaining between landowners.67 
B. First Challenge to Airspace Ownership: Fixed-Wing Aircraft 
As flight became a reality, courts recognized that the traditional proper-
ty theory of absolute ownership to a column of air would create unrealistic 
roadblocks to cross-country travel.68 Such flights would constitute 
“[f]requent and universal trespass on a large scale, theoretically banned by 
the law.”69 This dilemma is not unlike the one facing courts and lawmakers 
today: the rise of aircraft “caught the American courts without a coherent 
legal doctrine with which to address the clashes between landowners and 
 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 504(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“[A] possessor 
of livestock intruding upon the land of another is subject to liability for the intrusion although 
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent them from intruding.”). 
 62. Coleman v. United Fence Co., 282 Ark. 344, 345, 668 S.W.2d 536, 537 (1984) 
(recognizing that a trespasser is simply one who comes upon land without the consent of the 
possessor). 
 63. Gathings v. Johns, 216 Ark. 668, 670, 226 S.W.2d 978, 980 (1950). 
 64. See Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 19 N.Y. Ann. Cas. 315 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1906) 
(prohibiting a company from stringing a telephone poll across a piece of property at a height 
of 30 feet); Pomeroy, supra note 60, at 285 (citing cases limiting building overhang and 
structural additions that overhung even an inch). 
 65. Mensinger, supra note 59, at 410. 
 66. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 966, 978–79 (2004) (defining an exclusion regime as one in which “very rough signals 
or informational variables—such as presence inside or outside the boundary line around a 
parcel of land—are employed to protect an indefinite class of uses with minimal precision”). 
 67. See id. 
 68. Pomeroy, supra note 60, at 285 (“[H]istorically, people could not move over other 
people’s property without risking real liability. That worked fine for many, many years. 
Eventually, however, the world changed.”). 
 69. Mensinger, supra note 59, at 410. 
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aviators.”70 Consequently, state courts and legislatures began adopting a 
variety of property theories that abandoned the traditional ad coelom theory 
of absolute ownership and redefined airspace rights. 
Under two of these theories—the public easement theory and the privi-
lege of flight tort theory—surface owners continued to own the airspace, but 
the former recognized a public easement for aviation traffic,71 and the latter 
granted aviation traffic a privilege that was a defense to a trespass claim.
 72 
Overflights were actionable only when the easement was misused by “un-
reasonable interference”73 or the privilege was abused or exceeded.74 These 
theories limited surface owners’ ability to exclude aircraft from navigable 
space above their properties, but landowners continued to own all of the 
airspace. 
Under two other theories, landowners’ ownership excluded a zone of 
navigable airspace.75 The first zone theory—the fixed height theory—
marked the end of the surface owner’s ownership with a strict horizontal 
boundary; cases were therefore as easy to analyze as cases on the surface 
had been.76 If aircraft flew below the boundary, the landowner had a claim 
for trespass.77 The second zone theory gave surface owners ownership of the 
airspace, but limited it to an area of “effective possession.”78 Under this the-
ory, a court would determine the parcel’s area of effective possession, and 
then the theory would operate just as the fixed height theory: if aircraft flew 
within the area of effective possession, the landowner had a claim for tres-
 
 70. Walter S. King, The Fifth Amendment Takings Implications of Air Force Aircraft 
Overflights and the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Program, 43 A.F. L. REV. 197, 198 
(1997); see also Cahoon, supra note 7, at 163 (“To hold that every overflight was an actiona-
ble trespass would hamper the young industry and the military’s ability to train; yet to allow 
every low-flying barnstormer to terrorize rural communities with no consequence seemed an 
equally bad alternative.”). 
 71. Cahoon, supra note 7, at 164. This theory was introduced by the proposed Uniform 
State Law of Aeronautics in 1922 and eventually adopted in about half of the American 
states. Id. (citing ROBERT R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 11–30 (1968)). 
 72. Cahoon, supra note 7, at 164. This theory was adopted by the Restatement of Torts § 
194 (1934). Id.; see infra text accompanying note 35. 
 73. Cahoon, supra note 7, at 164. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (citing Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930); Burnham 
v. Beverly Airways, 42 N.E.2d 575 (Mass. 1942)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Cahoon, supra note 7, at 164. (citing Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 
201 (6th Cir. 1932); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 20 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. 1945); Thrasher v. City of 
Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817 (Ga. 1934)). 
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pass.79 Under both zone theories, airspace beyond the boundary was public 
property to which the surface owner had no claim.80 
While states limited surface owners’ rights to airspace over their par-
cels, Congress acted to establish the United States government as the “com-
plete and exclusive” sovereign over navigable airspace and to imply an ex-
tension of its authority even into non-navigable airspace.81 The Air Com-
merce Act of 1926 (ACA),
 
which was then replaced by the Civil Aero-
nautics Act (CAA), broadly defined “air commerce” and granted the public 
a “right of freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air 
space of the United States,” which was generally defined as above 500 
feet.82 Congress’s broadening language indicated “heavier federal influence 
in the regulation of airspace” and implied that any air commerce, even with-
in non-navigable airspace, “would remain subject to extensive federal regu-
lation.”83 
C. Arkansas’s Airspace Act of 1941 
In 1941, Arkansas passed section 27-116-102 of the Arkansas Code 
Annotated to define ownership of airspace and to allow for overflights. 
Some have argued that statutes passed to regulate “aircraft” should not apply 
to drones because drones should be treated as projectiles, like kites or bal-
loons or shotgun pellets.84 Projectiles are still part of the strict exclusionary 
regime and create actionable trespass when they are fired or flown over an-
other’s property.85 However, drones of all kinds fall squarely within Arkan-
sas’s statutory definition of “aircraft,” which includes “any contrivance now 
known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation of or flight in 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. One court adopted a “no ownership theory,” under which the landowner owns 
airspace only to the extent that it is actually occupied. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 
755 (9th Cir. 1936). Under this theory, a landowner suffers a compensable harm only when 
the overflight damages the underlying property. Cahoon, supra note 7, at 166. One commen-
tator calls this “probably the worst opinion ever written on the topic.” ROBERT R. WRIGHT, 
THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 131 (1968). 
 81. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Mensinger, supra note 59, at 412. 
 84. See Haughwont, 2016 WL 3919799 (D. Conn. 2016) (holding weaponized drone 
was “aircraft” and not a projectile under federal definition); Huerta v. Pirker, 2014 WL 
8095629, at *2 (National Transportation Safety Board) (holding drone was “aircraft” under 
broad, but clear, federal definition). 
 85. Under the Restatement approach, it is actionable trespass to fire or fly a projectile in 
the air above another’s property, even though no harm is done to the land or the surface own-
er’s enjoyment of it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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the air.”86 Courts will, therefore, apply section 27-116-102 to airspace con-
flicts created by drones. 
How a court would apply the statute to drones is difficult to predict for 
two reasons. First, the statute is a confusing mix of airspace theories. One 
remedy for Arkansas lawmakers, therefore, is to clean up the existing stat-
ute. 
Arkansas’s statute limits the surface owner’s ownership of airspace un-
der an effective possession theory, but then grants a privilege of flight. Sub-
part (a) of section 27-116-102 vests ownership of airspace “in the owner of 
the surface beneath, but this ownership extends only so far as is necessary to 
the enjoyment of the use of the surface without interference and is subject to 
the right of passage or flight of aircraft.”87 Subpart (c) declares flight lawful 
unless it is “low enough to interfere with the then-existing use to which the 
land or water or space over the land or water is put” or is “conducted so as 
to be dangerous or damaging to persons or property” beneath.88 Subpart (b) 
appears unnecessary, as it limits “actionable” claims for interference with 
the use and enjoyment of the land to flights that result in “actual damage to 
the land.”89 No decision has clarified the relationship between the subparts. 
Arkansas’s statute need not be this complex. As a comparison, both 
Idaho and Minnesota statutes clearly vest ownership in the space above the 
land in the owner of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight.90 Law-
ful flight is defined as a flight that does not interfere with the then-existing 
use to which the land is put by the owner, and flight that is not connected so 
as to be imminently dangerous or damaging to persons or property lawfully 
on the land beneath.91 These statutes still leave unanswered how much inter-
ference by a drone a court would allow before finding a trespass or nuisance 
had occurred, but their language is clearer than Arkansas’s. 
The second problem with predicting the statute’s application is in the 
nature of the statute itself: section 27-116-102, like all state statutes of its 
time, abandons the clarity and predictive application of the trespass exclu-
sion regime in favor of a nuisance governance regime. 
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has acknowledged that “over-
flights can constitute trespass,”92 when Arkansas courts have had to interpret 
 
 86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-114-101 (Repl. 2010) (definition applicable through -117). 
 87. ARK. CODE ANN. 27-116-102(a) (Repl. 2010). 
 88. ARK. CODE ANN. 27-116-102(c) (Repl. 2010). 
 89. ARK. CODE ANN. 27-116-102(b) (Repl. 2010). 
 90. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.012 (West 2017); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-101A (West 
2017). 
 91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.012; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-204 (West 2017). 
 92. Aviation Cadet Museum, Inc. v. Hammer, 373 Ark. 202, 212, 283 S.W.3d 198, 206 
(2008) (citing with approval Brenteson Wholesale, Inc. v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 803 P.2d 930, 
934 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)). 
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and apply section 27-116-102, they have relied exclusively on common law 
nuisance. The court has not explained how a trespass claim would require 
any different proof under the statute. 
In Arkansas’s primary case interpreting section 27-116-102, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court mentioned a trespass claim but relied exclusively on the 
law of nuisance to resolve the dispute. 
In Aviation Cadet Museum, Inc. v. Hammer, the Hammers claimed that 
Aviation Cadet Museum, Inc. (ACM)’s use of his neighboring land as an 
airport was a trespass and a nuisance.93 The lower court found nuisance be-
cause flights over the Hammer’s land were at “extremely low altitudes,” 
they were dangerous to people on the Hammer’s property, and they created 
excessive noise. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. 
First, drawing on common law surface nuisance cases, the court held 
that the “actual damage” requirement in section 27-116-102(b) “does not 
necessarily mean direct physical damage to the premises,” and that “nui-
sances can exist when the property owners’ use and enjoyment of their 
property was made much more difficult, and the offensive activity was abu-
sive to senses of hearing and smell.”94 Ten years later, the court affirmed its 
reliance on surface-area nuisance law to determine whether acts in airspace 
created actual damage under section 27-116-102(b): the court held “an ac-
tivity could constitute a nuisance if it created a substantial likelihood of 
danger in the future or if it could be shown to a reasonable certainty that 
danger was actually threatened rather than merely anticipated.”95 
Second, the Hammer court broadly interpreted the requirement in sec-
tion 27-116-102(c) to mean that the flight must not be “dangerous or damag-
ing to the persons or property beneath.”96 The court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that subsection (c) added an additional requirement to a traditional 
nuisance claim.97 The court held that the phrase “dangerous or damaging to 
persons or property beneath” meant that flight was lawful unless the “flight 
amounts to a nuisance, trespass, or otherwise poses a danger to the 
ground.”98 
Other jurisdictions have similarly used nuisance principles to govern 
airspace claims raised by airplanes,99 but this application of nuisance princi-
 
 93. Id. at 203, 283 S.W.3d at 200. 
 94. Id. at 208 n.3, 283 S.W.3d 198, 203 n.3 (2008) (citing Se. Arkansas Landfill, Inc. v. 
State, 313 Ark. 669, 858 S.W.2d 665 (1993) (smells from landfill); Higgs v. Anderson, 14 
Ark. App. 113, 685 S.W.2d 521 (1985) (noise from dog kennel); Baker v. Odom, 258 Ark. 
826, 529 S.W.2d 138 (1975) (noise from a motorcycle race track)). 
 95. Emerald Dev. Co. v. McNeill, 82 Ark. App. 193, 199, 120 S.W.3d 605, 610 (2003). 
 96. Hammer, 373 Ark. at 212, 283 S.W.3d at 206. 
 97. Id., 283 S.W.3d at 206. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965) (“Flight by aircraft in the air 
space above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if, it enters into the immediate reach-
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ples appears to have been sufficient to predictably resolve disputes. Air-
planes consistently take off and land from a central, predictable point and 
are large and noisy enough to disrupt use and enjoyment if they are flown at 
low altitudes.100 In addition, helicopters can fly legally underneath the navi-
gable airspace threshold, but they “can easily avoid trespass claims by 
choice because they don’t need to rise or descend through a lateral trajecto-
ry,”101 and smaller, model aircraft have not been the focus of reported deci-
sions.102 Successful nuisance claims for airspace overflights typically “in-
clude disturbance as a result of dust production, noise, vibration, and fre-
quency of flights.”103 And significant for the application of this statute to 
drone conflicts, courts have been reluctant to find that frequency of flights 
alone, without some accompanying noise or dust production, is enough to 
prove nuisance.104 
D. Drone Challenges to Arkansas’s Airspace Law 
Drone flights challenge the application of Arkansas’s nuisance-based 
airspace statute in new ways. First, surface owners will not know how far 
their ownership rights extend without first having a court decide how far 
down, how frequent, and how intrusive drone overflights must be to become 
actionable. Second, because under the statute the surface owner’s airspace 
extends as far as is necessary to enjoy the use of the surface, surface owners 
who fly drones over their property may in fact extend their ownership of the 
adjacent airspace.105 
 
es of the air space next to the land, and it interferes substantially with the other’s use and 
enjoyment of his land.”). 
 100. See Robert A. Heverly, The State of Drones: State Authority to Regulate Drones, 8 
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 29, 45 (2015) (“The courts have generally been able to address overflight 
takings issues as they arise without stifling flight technologies and operations.”). 
 101. Turza, supra note 31, at 330–31. 
 102. See Michelle Bolos, A Highway in the Sky: A Look at Land Use Issues that Will 
Arise with the Integration of Drone Technology, 2015 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 411, 421–
22 (2015) (opining that the test was not challenged by model aircraft because they were never 
as pervasive as drones threaten to be). 
 103. Bolos, supra note 102, at 422. 
 104. Id. at 422–23  
 105. See Pierce Giboney, Don’t Ground Me Bro! Private Ownership of Airspace and 
How It Invalidates the FAA’s Blanket Prohibition on Low Altitude Commercial Drone Oper-
ations, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2149, 2174 (2015) (giving as an example a university that hires a 
commercial drone operator to acquire aerial photographs and footage for advertising its cam-
pus). 
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1. When Would Drone Overflights Rise to an Actionable Level under 
the Arkansas Airspace Statute? 
Because Arkansas’s airspace statute adopts an effective possession the-
ory with a privilege of flight theory, property owners in Arkansas own air-
space to a point (to be determined by a court) that ensures the enjoyment of 
the current use of the surface, and the ownership of even this airspace is 
subject to the flight of all sizes of drones. Drones do not need a runway to 
take off, and so they may be launched from individual properties. Drones 
can be small enough to fit in your hand, and they may be quiet enough to fly 
over property without being noticed, especially if they are flown at higher 
altitudes.106 
So when would a drone overflight rise to the level of a trespass or a 
nuisance? Because section 27-116-102 privileges the right of flight, a tres-
pass action would require showing that the privilege had been abused.107 
Typically, this has required more proof than the frequency of the drone 
flights; the drone flights would have to fly “low enough” to interfere with 
the then-existing enjoyment and use of the property, and the drone flights 
may need to be found dangerous or abusive to the senses. In other words, a 
trespass claim would require a nuisance-based proof.108 The application 
would vary widely as the facts varied. 
One advantage of a fact-specific rule is that courts are given discretion 
to craft a result that appears equitable. The plaintiff’s claim of nuisance in 
the Hammer case was sympathetic: the defendants knew about the plaintiff’s 
use of their property when they bought theirs, and they knew that their activ-
ity would interfere with plaintiff’s use, but they claimed a privilege to do so 
anyway.109 The court made the fact-sensitive nuisance rules work in the 
plaintiff’s favor. 
The disadvantage of a nuisance regime is that property owners and 
drone operators would have to come to a court to determine where airspace 
rights extended and what behavior constituted a trespass. What if the drones 
stayed at 20 feet over the property, but had a camera? What if the drones 
flew at 5 feet, without a camera, but flew over the property daily?110 And 
 
 106. See Heverly, supra note 100, at 46; Turza, supra note 31, at 321–22 (arguing that 
because drones are quieter, smaller, and lighter, they pose “little risk of many of the legal 
concerns associated with private property rights”). But see Aymann Ismail, What Can Con-
sumer Drones Actually See?, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/05/
how_much_can_consumer_drones_actually_see.html (noting that the drone sounds “like a 
lawnmower”). 
 107. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-116-102(a) (Repl. 2010). 
 108. Wilson v. Brown, 320 Ark. 240, 241, 897 S.W.2d 546, 547 (1995). 
 109. Aviation Cadet Museum, Inc. v. Hammer, 373 Ark. 202, 208, 283 S.W.3d 198, 203 
(2008). 
 110. Rule, supra note 3, at 170. 
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would Arkansas law recognize a nuisance when the harm is only economic, 
and not physical?111 
The cost of uncertainty when conflicts are likely to increase between 
private parties is significant. Beyond the economic costs of stifling technol-
ogies and operators, we have already seen social costs: landowners are more 
likely to engage in self-help (like shooting an overflying drone) when legal 
remedies are uncertain or expensive.112 
2. Could the Possibility of Drone Use on the Property Actually Ex-
pand the Surface Owner’s Airspace Rights? 
Section 27-116-102(a) declares a surface owner’s airspace ownership 
“extends only so far as is necessary to the enjoyment of the use of the sur-
face without interference and is subject to the right of passage or flight of 
aircraft.”113 Section 27-116-102(c) makes flight unlawful that interferes with 
the then-existing use of the land. Under Arkansas’s effective possession 
theory of ownership, a court should review how the air above the surface 
may support and extend the use and enjoyment of the land beneath.114 
In 1941 when section 27-116-102(a) was adopted, a property owner’s 
activities occurred on the surface of the land and extended up to the possible 
tree- or power-line. But with the proliferation of drone use, a property own-
er’s usable space may extend all the way up to traditional navigable air-
space.115 “[T]he modern capabilities of drone technology allow landowners 
to use these higher altitudes not merely for recreational use but ‘in connec-
tion with the land.’”116 Even setting aside hobbyists who may use their own 
airspace for recreation, farmers use drones to survey crops, homeowners use 
drones to market property they wish to sell, and hunters use drones to survey 
potential hunting sites on their land. Arkansas’s statute allows a private 
 
 111. Compare Hammer, 373 Ark. at 208 n.3, 283 S.W.3d at 203 n.3 (“Physical harm does 
not necessarily mean direct physical damages to the premises. In Osborne, we noted that 
nuisances can exist when the property owners’ use and enjoyment of their property was made 
much more difficult, and the offensive activity was abusive to senses of hearing and smell.”), 
with Reeves v. Jackson, 207 Ark. 1089, 1093, 184 S.W.2d 256, 258 (1944) (“The right to 
maintain an action for the value of property, however small, of which the owner is wrongful-
ly deprived, is never denied. A trespass upon lands is actionable, although the damage to the 
owner is inappreciable.”). 
 112. See Elisha Fieldstadt, Case Dismissed Against William H. Meredith, Kentucky Man 
Arrested for Shooting Down Drone, NBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2015, 1:28 PM ET), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/case-dismissed-against-william-h-merideth-
kentucky-man-arrested-shooting-n452281. 
 113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-116-102(a) (Repl. 2010). 
 114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-116-102(c) (Repl. 2010). 
 115. Giboney, supra note 105, at 2174. 
 116. Id. 
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owner using drones to convert “previously unclaimed airspace into private 
ownership.”117 
It is not clear under the language of the statute whether the surface 
owner would need to actually use drones to claim the airspace, or whether 
the possibility that a private owner may use drones would be enough to 
claim airspace for all surface owners. Section 27-116-102(c) does appear to 
limit airspace only to protect a “then-existing use to which the land or water 
or space over the land or water is put.”118 
In sum, trespass actions against drone operators are likely, and Arkan-
sas’s current airspace ownership statute lacks a predictable application that 
could prevent conflict. 
IV. GRANTING SURFACE OWNERS A FIXED HEIGHT OF AIRSPACE RIGHTS: 
WHY IT MAKES SENSE AND WHY NO STATE HAS DONE IT 
Could and should Arkansas lawmakers go further than any state has 
yet, and vest in the surface owner ownership of a column of airspace up to a 
certain height? Doing so would reinstitute the predictable rules of trespass to 
resolve low-level drone conflict. Such laws would also likely be enforced in 
a manner that reflects the expectations of property owners. 
While the federal government has asserted supremacy over navigable 
space, Congress has not manifested an intent to take from states the power 
to define airspace for the purpose of trespass actions.119 Without a clean and 
manifest intent to supersede the state’s historic police power to define prop-
erty rights,120 the state still has a critical role to play in determining the con-
tours of airspace ownership and thereby of trespass law.121 
 
 117. Id. at 2175. 
 118. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-116-102(c) (Repl. 2010). 
 119. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 
42,119 (June 28, 2016) (adjudicating private property rights is beyond the scope of this rule; 
trespass rules are specifically reserved to the state); Heverly, supra note 100, at 60. 
 120. Nef v. Ag Servs. of Am., Inc., 79 Ark. App. 100, 111, 86 S.W.3d 4, 11 (2002); Ari-
zona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012). 
 121. See Heverly, supra note 100, at 60; Rule, supra note 3, at 197 (noting that state laws 
clearly defining airspace property rights need not conflict with federal law and would, in fact, 
“serve as an integral part of a larger, coordinated system of federal, state, and local drone 
laws that promote more efficient use of the nation’s precious airspace resources”); 
Mensinger, supra note 59, at 429–30 (“That variable state standards (with regards to trespass, 
nuisance, and other doctrines that similarly implicate individuals’ substantive rights is air-
space) remain virtually untouched by federal airspace regulations suggests . . . that states’ 
prerogatives in the realm of non-navigable airspace remain substantial.”). 
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And yet no state currently grants surface owners the right to exclude 
drones up to a fixed height, primarily because of uncertainty in the law and 
in the extent of federal jurisdiction over airspace.122 
A. The Benefits of a Fixed-Height Airspace Ownership: Predictability, 
Economic Fairness, and Fourth Amendment Clarity 
In his excellent recent article on airspace rights, Professor Troy Rule 
urges states to adopt new laws giving landowners the right to exclude drones 
from the airspace above their land, laws that would “give a definite ceiling 
to the three-dimensional column of space initially allocated to surface own-
ers under the common law’s ad coelom doctrine.”123 To justify his recom-
mendation, Professor Rule draws on principles of microeconomics and 
property theory, and names the following three primary benefits of extend-
ing the exclusionary regime up to a definite height.124 
1. Increased Predictability Under a Fixed-Height Regime 
 First, as noted above, nuisance requires a balancing of facts and is, 
therefore, an unpredictable remedy, at least until an adequate body of inter-
pretive case law is created in a jurisdiction. As Professor Rule notes, “[t]he 
case-by-case nature of these rules could place unjustifiable burdens on 
courts and deter drone operators and landowners from making efficient in-
vestment decisions relating to their respective interest in low-altitude space” 
because of the likely volume of conflicts between low-flying drone opera-
tors and property owners.125 Lower altitudes of airspace, outside the naviga-
ble airspace of fixed-wing aircraft and outside any zones the federal gov-
ernment established for more powerful commercial drones, should be gov-
erned more like the surface—with predictable exclusionary rules of trespass. 
2. Economically and Politically Efficient and Fair Allocation 
If property owners have the right to exclude drones from lower alti-
tudes, the drone operators would be forced to avoid private property or seek 
easements from landowners.126 In this way, an exclusionary regime shifts the 
 
 122. Oregon recently eliminated statutory language that granted a surface owner owner-
ship up to 400 feet, see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.380 (West 2016), and California just 
considered but did not adopt legislation that would have fixed the height at 350 feet, see 
Rule, supra note 3, at 159 (recommending a column of space up to 500 feet). 
 123. Rule, supra note 3, at 159 (recommending a column of space up to 500 feet). 
 124. Id. at 158. 
 125. Id. at 185. 
 126. Id. 
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expense of drone operations where it should be—on the operators.127 Under 
Arkansas’s current airspace statute, the landowner bears the expense and the 
uncertainty of challenging the drone’s flight over his property.128 
In addition, allowing states and even municipalities to regulate low-
altitude flight shifts decision making to the narrowest specifically relevant 
body.129 While the FAA worries that this will create a “patchwork” of regu-
lations,130 low-flying drones are not likely to be operated interstate (except 
for those who live near state lines),131 and states have regularly delegated to 
municipalities the authority to regulate activities—like setting off fireworks 
or raising livestock—that do not affect those living outside the city.132 “Be-
cause of their information advantages, municipal governments are often 
better equipped than state or federal governments to determine when, where, 
and under what conditions such intrinsically local activities are allowed.”133 
Allowing states this regulatory authority, therefore, encourages an efficient, 
more locally sensitive system. 
3. Fourth Amendment Applications 
Finally, increased certainty in property laws will lead to increased pre-
dictability as to the extent of Fourth Amendment protections. Although Ar-
kansas has not done so, some states have acted statutorily to clarify the ex-
tent to which law enforcement agencies may use drones to investigate, de-
tect, or prosecute crime.134 States have acted in the absence of clear federal 
common law on whether this use of drones violates the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See supra Section III.C. 
 129. Rule, supra note 3, at 203–04. 
 130. See FAA OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/
uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/media/uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf. 
 131. Heverly, supra note 100, at 47 (“As drones are likely to be operated locally, often 
staying within states and even specific jurisdictions within them, the need for national rules 
need not be emphasized. Instead, drone operators can adapt to local controls, even if they 
exist in a patchwork across jurisdictions. Longer flights which do cross jurisdictional bounda-
ries are likely to take place at higher altitudes and to follow more traditional flight patterns 
including takeoffs and landings from established locations, subjecting them to FAA control. 
All of these elements together indicate that states may indeed have a significant role to play 
in regulating drone flights, especially in the short term.”). 
 132. Rule, supra note 3, at 201. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 4622 (West 2017) (prohibiting this use of drones 
but allowing drone use with a warrant or for “observational, public safety purposes that do 
not involve gathering or retaining data”); FLA. STAT. ANN. 934.50 (West 2017) (prohibiting a 
law enforcement agency from using a drone to gather evidence or other information); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.310 (West 2017) (allows drone use only with a warrant or under 
exigent circumstances). 
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But these conduct restrictions would be less necessary if a state were to 
adopt clearer property laws. 
In a recent Harvard Law Review article, Professors William Baude and 
James Y. Stern note that “several recent Supreme Court decisions have sug-
gested something of a property renaissance in Fourth Amendment law.”135 
Under this emerging framework, courts are more likely to allocate Fourth 
Amendment privileges in a manner consistent with a state’s definition of 
property.136 Consequently, as the state’s law on airspace ownership and 
rights of flights are clarified, the extent of Fourth Amendment protections 
will be clarified.137 In the absence of state-law clarity, “[t]ragically, most 
courts still have little more than the FAA’s safety-based regulations to assist 
them in determining whether officers or the public have a ‘right to be’ in 
any particular area of low-altitude airspace.”138 
In Florida v. Riley, when the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that a property owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy if an activity 
is viewable from navigable airspace, it relied upon the FAA’s definition of 
navigable airspace to set that line.139 If, under FAA regulations, the overfly-
ing aircraft is where it has a right to be, the property owner has no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in anything observable from (or by) that air-
craft.140 Drones are exactly the technological advance imagined by Justice 
Brennan in his argument that the Court’s reliance on FAA regulations to 
determine whether a property owner enjoyed a reasonable expectation of 
privacy was misplaced: 
Imagine a helicopter capable of hovering just above an enclosed court-
yard or patio without generating any noise, wind, or dust at all—and, for 
good measure, without posing any threat of injury. Suppose the police 
employed this miraculous tool to discover not only what crops people 
were growing in their greenhouses, but also what books they were read-
ing and who their dinner guests were. Suppose, finally, that the FAA 
regulations remained unchanged, so that the police were undeniably 
“where they had a right to be.” Would today’s plurality continue to assert 
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
 
 135. William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1834 (2016). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1883–84; see also Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 313 (2016) (“[W]hen the law has made a deliberate choice to protect against certain intru-
sions on property and security by private parties, then police should have to adduce some 
kind of justification for undertaking a similar intrusion.”). 
 138. Rule, supra note 3, at 174. 
 139. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989) (helicopter 400 feet up and within navi-
gable airspace); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (1000 feet up). 
 140. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–50. 
268 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” was not in-
fringed by such surveillance?
141
 
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Jones, where 
the Court grappled with whether the Fourth Amendment is violated by the 
use of a tracking device attached to the bottom of a car, raises two more 
ways FAA regulations may be determinative in future drone surveillance 
challenges.142 
First, the majority in Jones reaffirmed the traditional trespassory, or 
property-based, test of the Fourth Amendment.143 The majority held that 
because the government trespassed on Jones’s personal property to attach 
the tracking devices, the Fourth Amendment was violated.144 However, if the 
government uses a drone instead of a GPS tracker, and if property owners 
have no exclusionary rights to the airspace above their homes, the traditional 
trespassory, or property-based, test of the Fourth Amendment would not be 
the test applied to the search. The property owner would instead have to 
show a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the airspace above his or her 
home.145 Justice Sotomayer observed this gap in her concurrence, noting 
“[i]n cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not 
depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespas-
sory test may provide little guidance.”146 
Second, both Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice Alito’s concurrences 
note the “degree of circularity” in the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test.147 As Justice Alito notes, this test 
rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a 
well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology 
can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead 
to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately 
produce significant changes in popular attitudes.
148
 
In other words, as drone overflights become more frequent, courts may 
determine that the hypothetical reasonable person cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy anywhere in his or her own backyard. Justice Alito 
concludes: “In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the 
 
 141. Id. at 462–63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 142. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 143. Id. at 404–07. 
 144. Id. at 404. 
 145. See id. at 405, 406 (reaffirming the “close connection” of the Fourth Amendment to 
property rights, which were the original protected zones until supplemented by the Katz rea-
sonable-expectation-of-privacy test) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)). 
 146. Id.at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. 
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best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is 
well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and 
to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”149 
These three benefits that an exclusionary regime up to a fixed ceiling 
offers—that property owners would avoid and resolve disputes under a more 
predictable system, that the allocation would be economically and politically 
efficient and fair, and that the Fourth Amendment applications would be 
more certain—are significant, and yet the perceived challenges discussed 
below have dissuaded states from adopting such a regime. 
B. The Obstacles to a Fixed-Height Airspace Ownership: Uncertainty of 
Application and Federal Preemption 
When a fixed-height bill was proposed in California in 2015, Governor 
Brown vetoed it and indicated his concern that it would expose “the occa-
sional hobbyist and FAA-approved commercial user alike to burdensome 
litigation and new causes of action.”150 Governor Brown’s concern is under-
standable given the uncertainty of the coming drone conflicts, but one of the 
benefits of setting ownership to a fixed height is that property owners and 
drone operators have more certain rights vis-à-vis each other. Presumably, 
this would lead to less litigation, rather than more. But there are some who 
argue that a balancing regime, with a focus on harm incurred by the land-
owner, is more appropriate in overflight cases.151 
The larger, more legitimate barrier to granting airspace rights to surface 
owners is the FAA’s position, made clear through recent regulations, filings, 
and comments, that laws drawing a line under which a surface owner may 
exclude all-comers are likely preempted by the FAA’s charge to set altitude 
limits and to regulate navigable airspace and aircraft.152 Arkansas recognizes 
federal preemption when there is a congressional intent to preempt, given 
either expressly or through “pervasive regulations that ‘occupy the entire 
field,’ or through evidence that state law so conflicts with federal that the 
purposes of federal law are frustrated.”153 
 
 149. Id. at 427–28, 429–30 (referring to Congress’s wiretapping laws as an example). 
 150. Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of the State of California, to Members 
of the California State Senate (Sept. 9, 2015), available at https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/
SB_142_Veto_Message.pdf. 
 151. See Cahoon, supra note 7, at 196. (calling harm to the landowner the proper focus of 
these cases). 
 152. See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012). 
 153. Emerald Dev. Co. v. McNeill, 82 Ark. App. 193, 197, 120 S.W.3d 605, 608 (2003). 
For a detailed discussion of the federal government’s history of very heavy involvement in 
aviation law, see generally Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, Phoenix Grounded: The Impact
 of the Supreme Court’s Changing Preemption Doctrine on State and Local Impediments to 
Airport Expansion, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 963–68 (2003). 
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This section outlines the case for federal preemption, from common 
law federal takings law to recent federal regulations. 
1. Causby’s Lasting Ambiguities 
The 1946 federal takings case, United States v. Causby, is the common 
law foundation for modern airspace law;154 like the ambiguities in airspace 
statutory law from the same period, the issues left open by the Supreme 
Court in Causby remain open. In Causby, the Court eliminated the ad coe-
lom theory of absolute ownership of airspace, it asserted the authority of the 
federal government under the Commerce Clause to regulate navigable 
space, and it articulated a nuisance test for takings claims.155 It did not hold, 
however, whether the federal government could regulate outside of the nav-
igable airspace and where the private airspace ownership line ended. 
During World War II, the federal government obtained the right to use 
an airfield near Greensboro, North Carolina.156 The Causbys, chicken farm-
ers who had owned property one-third of a mile from the airport since 1934, 
saw a dramatic increase in the air traffic over their land with the govern-
ment’s use. Large army bombers frequently flew over their land at a height 
as low as eighty-three feet, making more noise and causing more disturb-
ance than the private planes. The increased noise and the glare from the 
lights on planes flying at night disturbed the Causbys’ sleep and frightened 
their chickens so much than many of them flew into walls and were killed.157 
The Causbys sued the federal government, arguing that the frequent 
and regular flights of the government’s aircraft at low altitudes over their 
land constituted a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.158 
Under Supreme Court’s takings precedent, if the Court continued to apply 
the traditional ad coelom theory of absolute ownership, this physical inva-
sion of the airspace above Causbys’ farm constituted a per se taking.159 This 
takings case, therefore, required the Court to examine theories of airspace 
ownership. 
The Government argued that Congress had given the federal govern-
ment “complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space” over the 
 
 154. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see also Mensinger, supra note 
59, at 414 (“[T]he Takings context (in which issues regarding airspace typically arise) differs 
in fundamental ways from the Commerce Clause context.”). 
 155. Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61. 
 156. Id. at 258. 
 157. Id. at 259. 
 158. Id. at 258. 
 159. See Heverly, supra note 100, at 40. 
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country,160 and that all citizens of the United States had a public right of 
transit through navigable airspace.161 Because the flights were within the 
navigable airspace and there wasn’t a physical invasion of the property, the 
Government argued there was no taking.162 In short, the Government argued 
landowners did not own any airspace they had not occupied with a struc-
ture.163 
The Court disagreed.164 The Court recognized that although the air-
space is a public highway, surface owners must have “exclusive control of 
the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”165 The Court held that 
a landowner owns “at least as much of the space above the ground as he can 
occupy or use in connection with the land.”166 This “superadjacent airspace” 
need not be occupied in a physical sense; the court recognized that some 
space was necessary to a landowner’s full enjoyment of the land, and “for 
the purpose of light and air.”167 
Significantly, the Court then relied on North Carolina law to define the 
landowner’s airspace rights, recognizing that, for Fifth Amendment takings 
issues, the term “will normally obtain its content by reference to local 
law.”168 For federal takings jurisprudence, this basis of property definitions 
in state law is well established.169 Because North Carolina’s statute defined 
airspace property as vested in the surface owners subject to the right of 
flight, and defined lawful flight as flight that does not interfere with the sur-
face owner’s use of the property, the Court held that its definition of air-
space property rights was “not inconsistent with” North Carolina’s defini-
tion.170 The Court did not hold that the federal government, rather than the 
state, has the right to define state property. 
With this definition of airspace rights, the Court held that “flights over 
private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be 
a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the 
 
 160. Causby, 328 U.S. at 260 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 176(a); Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 
Stat. 568, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973) (noting that under 
the cited statutes, “the United States has ‘complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the 
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 161. Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2012). 
 162. Causby, 328 U.S. at 260. 
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 168. Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. 
 169. See Heverly, supra note 100, at 54 (“Whether a change in language would push the 
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land.”171 The Court recognized the ambiguities of the test, but refused to 
articulate the “precise limits” of how low or how frequent flights need be to 
take private property.172 
The Causby Court recognized that a property owner had ownership in 
“superadjacent airspace” in connection with the owner’s use and enjoyment 
of the land, but as noted above, the Court did not do more to define this air-
space. The Court’s language, however, is inconsistent with either an ease-
ment or privilege theory where the surface owner continues to own the air-
space subject to a public right of use: the Court held navigable airspace does 
not belong to private owners, and it did not award the Causbys damages for 
an “abuse” of an easement or a privilege.173 
The Court did not indicate which of the zone theories—either the 
fixed-height theory or the effective possession theory—it was applying to 
define the superadjacent airspace. The Court’s language supports both theo-
ries. The Court relied on the fact that navigable space is outside private 
ownership and that these planes were flying below the navigable space over 
Causby’s land.174 But the Court then held that the “landowner owns at least 
as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connec-
tion with the land.”175 And, if the Court was implicitly endorsing a fixed-
height property theory, it wasn’t clear whether superadjacent property ex-
tends all the way to navigable airspace, or whether “a zone of unclaimed 
airspace exists between navigable airspace and superadjacent airspace.”176 
This ambiguity in Causby was partially resolved by a 1962 Supreme 
Court case, Griggs v. Alleghany County, where the Court appeared to adopt 
the second zone theory—that the landowner owns what is within her “effec-
tive possession”—rather than a fixed height theory.177 In Griggs, the Court 
found a taking had occurred, even though the low-flying aircraft causing the 
disruption over the Griggs’s land were in navigable space.178 The Court fo-
cused on interference with reasonable use of private land: “[T]he use of land 
presupposes the use of some of the airspace above it. Otherwise, no home 
could be built, no tree planted, no fence constructed, no chimney erected. 
An invasion of the ‘superadjacent airspace’ will often ‘affect the use of the 
surface of the land itself.’”179 It had no effect on the Court’s holding that the 
flights were within navigable space; therefore, the fixed-height theory of 
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property as a sole method of determining airspace property rights appeared 
abandoned.180 
But does federal takings law preempt state definition of airspace up to 
navigable airspace? Causby may be read to require states to allow over-
flights unless the surface owner can show a harm.181 Alternatively, Causby 
may be read “to allow states to step in and set navigable airspace for drones 
below that limit set by the FAA for other aircraft.”182 Although even with 
these state limits, if a drone interferes with the use and enjoyment of the 
land it would be a taking.183 Regardless, states like North Carolina and Ar-
kansas failed to clarify airspace rights, and eventually enough cases present-
ed enough factual variations that “the law coalesced” and airports acquired 
rights to neighboring properties and “the aerial trespass debate largely fiz-
zled out.”184 Neither the ambiguities in Causby’s limits on state authority to 
grant airspace rights nor the ambiguities in state statutory definitions have 
since been resolved. 
2. Federal Regulations Increasing in Number and Scope 
Congress has vested the FAA with authority to regulate navigable air-
space and to ensure the safety of aircraft and efficient use of airspace.185 The 
FAA also has the authority to “prescribe air traffic regulations on the flight 
of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes).”186 The FAA treats all 
drones, no matter the size or purpose, as aircraft, and courts have affirmed 
the FAA’s interpretation. But courts have had limited opportunities to affirm 
FAA’s further jurisdictional claim: that because “navigable airspace” is the 
 
 180. See id.; see generally Cahoon, supra note 7, at 180. 
 181. See Causby, 328 U.S. 256; see also Heverly, supra note 100, at 43–44. 
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FACT SHEET, (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/
media/uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf. 
 186. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2). 
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“airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight,”187 the FAA may preempt 
state efforts to regulate airspace down to the tips of the blades of grass.188 
In 2013, the FAA charged Raphael Pirker for allegedly operating an 
unmanned aircraft in a careless or reckless manner and assessed a civil pen-
alty of $10,000.189 The charges came from a posted video that Pirker had 
created two years earlier from drone flight over the University of Virginia, 
who had hired Pirker to create a video of its campus.190 The FAA alleged 
that Pirker flew the drone at extremely low altitudes—as low as 10 feet from 
the ground—and through a tunnel and under a crane.191 
The Administrative Law Judge vacated the order of assessment, hold-
ing that the drone used was more like a model aircraft than an aircraft, and 
was therefore not subject to the same regulations.192 The NTSB reversed, 
and held that 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6), which defines “aircraft” as “any con-
trivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air” was 
“broad” but clearly covered any unmanned aircraft, “large or small.”193 After 
deciding this threshold issue, the court remanded to the administrative law 
judge and refused to consider other arguments Pirker raised on appeal, in-
cluding whether the FAA was able to regulate airspace so close to the 
ground.194 Pirker argued that the FAA lacked jurisdiction to regulate drone 
flight at low altitudes, below the tree-top level, and underneath an overpass 
because the spaces were not “navigable airspace” subject to FAA jurisdic-
tion.195 Because the parties settled after the remand, this argument was not 
subsequently decided by the administrative law judge.196 
In July 2016, the United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut held similarly that the FAA could act to regulate drones because 
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Congress’s definition of “aircraft” is “stunningly broad.”197 In Huerta v. 
Haughwout, the FAA sought to enforce subpoenas against the Haughwouts 
to investigate YouTube videos showing the Houghwouts operating weapon-
ized drones.198 The district court held the broad definition of aircraft gave 
the FAA authority to investigate the use of drones, but it acknowledged it 
may have held differently had it been presented with a penalty enforcement 
action against the Haughwouts for operating the drone on their own proper-
ty.199 
In oral arguments, the FAA had asserted regulatory sovereignty “over 
every cubic inch of outdoor air in the United States.”200 This position is con-
sistent with other statements from the FAA. In 2014, the FAA asserted it is 
“responsible for air safety from the ground up” under its broad authority to 
protect individuals and property on the ground and to prevent collisions.201 
Cease and desist letters routinely contain statements like the following: 
“Private landowners do not have any jurisdiction over the airspace above 
their property and cannot prohibit or allow aviation operations over their 
land.”202 The FAA argues that the extension of its authority into private 
backyards is just a logical extension of the definitions of “aircraft” and 
“navigable airspace.”203 
The extent of recent regulations supports the FAA’s position that it 
views all drones of any size as aircraft and navigable airspace as airspace 
from the ground up, and that it intends to “occupy the entire field.”204 The 
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2016 FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, which reauthorized 
FAA funding and authority, and recent regulations, including Part 107, in-
crease regulations over drone operations without excluding drone flight in 
private space.205 Drones must be operated within unaided sight, cannot be 
operated in a careless or reckless manner or over a nonparticipant, under a 
covered structure, or inside a stationary vehicle.206 The FAA argues that a 
“navigable airspace free from inconsistent state and local restrictions is es-
sential to the maintenance of a safe and sound air transportation system,”207 
and that because drones are aircraft and may be operated just over the 
ground, the national airspace by definition goes all the way to the ground.208 
It is the FAA’s position that reserving low-level airspace to the state may 
lead to “fractionalized control” of the airspace or a “‘patchwork quilt’ of 
differing restrictions” that would threaten “the maintenance of a safe and 
sound air transportation system.”209 
The District Court in Haughwout indicated that the FAA’s broad asser-
tions of regulatory authority may be inconsistent with not only Congress’s 
references to “navigable airspace,” but also the Constitution’s delegation of 
traditional police powers to state and local governments because they are 
typically better positioned to regulate what people do in their own back-
yards.210 The court noted “[n]o clause in the Constitution vests the federal 
government with a general police power over all of the air or all objects that 
leave the ground.” Further, the court was troubled that the authority extends 
beyond the limits of the Commerce Clause because “it is far from clear that 
Congress intends—or could constitutionally intend—to regulate all that is 
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airborne on one’s own property and that poses no plausible threat to or sub-
stantial effect on air transport or interstate commerce in general.”211 
The court ended by quoting Causby: 
In a different context, the Supreme Court has “said that the airspace is a 
public highway,” but that “it is obvious that if the landowner is to have 
full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the imme-
diate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere,” or else “buildings could not 
be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be 
run.” And so the Supreme Court recognized even 70 years ago that “[t]he 
landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can 
occupy or use in connection with the land.” If that much is clear, does it 
follow that this foundational principle must vanish or yield to FAA dic-
tate the moment that a person sets any object aloft (i.e., an “aircraft”) no 
matter how high in the airspace outside one’s home? This case does not 
yet require an answer to that question. Regardless, as with the advent of 
airplanes before them, the next generation of drones and similar flying 




This once latent question about the extent of federal preemption over 
airspace is now critically important and still unresolved by a court. That the 
issue of whether this authority extends the FAA’s exclusive jurisdiction be-
yond navigable airspace “has remained unaddressed is, presumably, a testa-
ment to both its difficulty and the fact that courts can easily avoid deciding 
the issue in a world where commercial air safety generally requires flight at 
altitudes higher than 500 feet.”213 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite broad statements from the FAA as to its regulatory authority, 
Congress has not indicated that it intends to remove from the state its broad 
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police powers to regulate lower-altitude airspace. This power extends be-
yond the commerce clause, and properly remains with the states. 
And yet while states grapple with applying airspace law developed for 
fixed-wing overflights to drone overflights, no state yet has done what some 
scholars encourage is possible: provide surface owners with a clear column 
of airspace ownership and restore to them the right to exclude drones from 
that space. Were Arkansas to do so, such a law would bring the airspace 
property laws in line with the public’s expectations, improve predictability 
in the application of the law, improve efficiency and fairness, and strengthen 
Fourth Amendment protections. 
At a minimum, Arkansas should not limit its legislation to provisions 
regulating the conduct of private drone operations. Arkansas should act to 
strengthen and clarify airspace rights through amending and simplifying 
section 27-116-102, which was written to define airspace ownership in the 
age of fixed-wing flights. Drone overflights present a new challenge to old, 
ill-suited laws, and surface owners and drone operators both should have 
clear direction as to when a surface owner may exclude a drone from adja-
cent airspace. 
